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our children are entrusted with none of the traditional constitutional safeguards
with which we protect the most unsavory of other of our citizens.
A warning has been sounded by Judge Jesse Olney of California,
It (the juvenile court) is fast developing into a complete system of fascism,
as dangerous to our institutions as communism. Our youth are jailed, bailed,
granted or denied rights on the mere order of probation officers, county
attorneys, sheriffs and other executive officers. Laws and regulations are
made not by legislation or settled law but by those in control. Juvenile
executives are properly called 'the law'. A further question arises whether
under such a judicial system there is any method by which personal rights
can be protected? The Juvenile Court machinery is supposedly geared to
insure order, but there appears nothing to protect rights" 2 9 .
Consider again the hypothetical case of John X, the sixteen year old boy
who did not like to go to school. Would not our constitutional safeguards of
trial by jury, confrontation by witnesses, assistance of counsel, and uncoerced
confessions have stood him in better stead than the streamlined procedure of
the juvenile court?
To negate the possibility of a case such as John's ever occurring it would
seem that into the existing framework of the juvenile court our traditional
constitutional guaranties should be fitted. Then even our junior citizens will be
assured of justice under law.
ISABELLE R. CAPPELLO
29 Olney, Juvenile Courts-Abolish Them, 13 Cal. State Bar Journal 1, 2 (1938).
Present Status of Price Maintenance
Contracts in Interstate Commerce
The proponents of the Fair Trade Movement are faced with a problem as
a result of the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Schwegmann
Bros. et al. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951). The court ruled
that price fixing agreements valid under state laws 1 could not be enforced
against nonsigners under the Miller-Tydings Amendment 2 to the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act 3 with regard to interstate commerce. The court's decision being
based on the fact that the Miller-Tydings Amendment 4 did not specifically
contain a nonsigner provision whereas all the state acts contained a nonsigner
clause. At the present time all states have fair trade acts except Missouri, Texas
I Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936);
McNeil v. Joseph Triner Corp., 229 U. S. 183 (1936); Kunsman v. Max Factor & Co.,
299 U. S. 198 (1936).2 Amendment to Par. I of the Sherman Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. §1(1946).
326 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §1-7 (1946).4 See note 2, supra.
and the District of Columbia. The dissenting opinion in the Schwegmann case 5
stated that the nonsigner clause was implied in the Miller-Tydings Amendment 6
by reference.
The economic conditions of the late twenties and early thirties gave rise to
legislation concerning or governing price maintenance. Protection of the small
retailer from the large chains and the desire of the manufacturers to protect
their trade-mark and good-will interests in their product were the prime motives
for this type of legislation. In the light of the drastic effect of the great de-
pression on retail sales, income and business in general, one can justify the
need for such a control as the resale price contract. At its inception resale
price agreements had a three-fold purpose. First, to protect the manufacturer's
property interest in his trade-mark; secondly, to protect the distributor against
unscrupulous price cutting, and finally to protect the public generally.
No specific reference was made to price fixing agreements in the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act passed in 1890.7 However, Sec. 1 of that Act stated:
Every contract, combination in form or trust . . . or conspiracy in restraint
of trade . . . is hereby declared to be illegal . . .
This section was judicially construed by the United States Supreme Court
to prohibit price maintenance.8 The Federal Trade Commission Act passed in
1914 9 prohibited "unfair methods of competition." The Supreme Court in-
terpreted the Federal Trade Commission Act to outlaw resale price contracts. 10
Thus under both the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act resale
price maintenance contracts were illegal and void. There was a continuous effort
to have federal legislation passed legalizing resale price maintenance contracts
in interstate commerce. In 1929 during the 71st Congress, the Capper-Kelly
Fair Trade Bill was offered." This bill merely legalized an agreement "That
the vendee will not resell the commodity specified in the contract except at the
stipulated price."' 2 The Capper-Kelly bill never became law but it did serve.
as a model for future legislation both state and federal. It is interesting to
note that the Capper-Kelly bill did not include a nonsigner clause.
State legislatures in the meantime were not idle. California became the
first state to pass a bill legalizing price maintenance contracts. 18 This law was
6 Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951).
6 See Note 2, supra.
7 See Note 3, supra.
8 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
0 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended 15 U. S. C. §41-51 (1946).
'OF. T. C. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441 (1922).
11 H. R. Rep. No. 11, 71st Cong 1st Sess. (1929); H. R. Rep. No. 536, 71st Cong.
2nd Sess. (1930).
12 See Note 11, supra.
i8 Cal. Stat. 1931, c. 278.
later altered to include a nonsigner clause. 14 Vested interests led the way in
having this type of legislation enacted. One of the most effective groups was
the National Association of Retail Druggists. 15 The National Industrial Re-
covery Act also gave impetus to such legislation. The example set by California
was periodically followed by other states passing similar fair trade legislation
until in 1941 there were forty-five states having this type of law on their statute
books. 16 The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Illinois and the California acts in their entirety.17 The Court in Old Dearborn
Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp,.'s declared the principal provisions
including the nonsigner clause in the Illinois statute as constitutional. On the
strength of this decision state legislatures were now deluged with fair trade
bills, which included the nonsigner clause.
Prior to the Miller-Tydings Amendment price fixing contracts were pro-
hibited by the Federal Anti-Trust Laws where interstate commerce was con-
cerned. This Amendment to the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act became law on August 17, 1937 and is commonly known as the
Miller-Tydings Amendment. 19 This Amendment, which was an exception to
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, legalized resale price maintenance contracts where
they were valid under state law. President Roosevelt signed the bill but ex-
pressed his fear that the law would hurt the consumer because it would lead to
higher prices. Experience would seem to bear out the President's contention
in this regard. The Federal Trade Commission was opposed to the Miller-
Tydings Amendment. The Commission further stated that the public was
opposed to a resale price maintenance amendment to the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. The Commission maintained that the Sherman Act itself was opposed to
resale price maintenance.
The Commission had been pursuing a vigorous policy up to the passage
of the Miller Tydings Amendment in issuing cease and desist orders in con-
formance with the Federal Trade Commission Act. The basis of the Com-
mission's opposition was the fact that the Federal Government would be at-
tempting to enforce various and different state regulations. Furthermore, the
agreements were to be made without public hearings. 20
The Federal Law legalizing price maintenance contracts respecting trade-
marked or branded items sold in interstate commerce provided that making such
contracts would not constitute an unfair method of competition under the Fed-
14 Cal. Stat. 1933, c. 260: The Cal. law is now found in Business & Professions Code,
Pt. 2, c. 3, par. 16904.
15 Grether, Price Control Under Fair Trade Legislation, p. 54 (1939) ; 24 Calif. L. Rev.
640 (1936).
16 2 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. 1951 par. 7056.
17 See Note 1, supra.
18 1ll. Laws 1935, p. 1436.
19 Public Act No. 314, 75th Congress.
20 Address by William A. Ayres, Chairman of Federal Trade Commission, before
National Wholesale Druggists' Association Convention, Oct. 4, 1937.
eral Trade Commission Act. 21 This type of contract was permitted on com-
modities sold in interstate commerce if they were to be sold in a state where
such contracts were legalized with respect to intrastate sales.
22
The effect of the Miller-Tydings Amendment did not legalize the efforts
of the contracting parties to coerce nonsigners to comply, because the nonsigner
clause contained in all state statutes was not included in this Amendment to
the Sherman Act. This was the opinion of the majority of the court in the
Schwegmann case.23 It was also pointed out that although state laws generally
contain provisions declaring it unfair competition for a nonsigner to sell below
fair trade prices an attempt by contracting parties to coerce nonsigners to com-
ply, where interstate commerce is involved, is a violation of the Federal law
and reliance on state law is of no avail to protect such practices. The effect
of the decision in this case can be seen in recent state decisions concerning fair
trade laws. The nonsigner provisions in the state laws have been stricken down
where interstate commerce is involved under the doctrine of the Schwegmann
case. Several states have also held that the nonsigner provision is invalid now
under state law.24  In a recent Pennsylvania case the argument was advanced
that since all of the sales of the nonsigner were intrastate, the federal law
would not control the situation and the state fair trade law would apply.2 5 The
manufacturer argued that since the commodity had become to rest in the state
and was out of interstate commerce, state law would be applicable under the
familiar dictrine of the Schecter case. -6 This argument was contrary to the
decision in the Schwegmann case. Thus a manufacturer cannot prevent price
cutting by a nonsigner under a state fair trade law. On the same day the court
decided that the manufacturer of a trade-marked article has no common law right
to prevent a retailer from cutting prices.27
It is hard to forecast how the proponents of resale price fixing agreements
will act to overcome the effect of the Schwegmann case. Public opinion is
generally opposed to resale price maintenance contracts. Two very important
considerations involved in the administration of such a federal law would be
(1) the difficulty and and expense of enforcement, and (2) the constitutional
problem of depriviilg a nonsigner of a public hearing.
21 See Note 9, supra.
22 Resale Price Maintenance, by the Federal Trade Commission, dated Dec. 13, 1945.
23 See Note 5, supra.
24 Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Sach's, 48 N. W. 2d 531 (1951).
Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So. 235 (1951).
25 Sunbeam Corp. v. Civil Service Employee's Co-Operative Assn., 187 F. 2d 768 3rd
Cir. (1951).
26 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
2 7Sunbeam Corp. v. S. A. Wentling, 91 F. Supp. 81 (M. D. Pa. 1951).
